Blockchain, as the backbone technology of the current popular Bitcoin digital currency, has become a promising decentralized approach for resource and transaction management. Although blockchain has been widely adopted in many applications, e.g., finance, healthcare, and logistics, its application in mobile environments is still limited. This is due to the fact that blockchain users need to solve preset proof-of-work puzzles to add new transactions to the blockchain. Solving the proof-of-work, however, consumes substantial resources in terms of CPU time and energy, which is not suitable for resource-limited mobile devices. To facilitate blockchain applications in future mobile Internet of Things systems, multiple access mobile edge computing appears to be an auspicious option to solve the proof-of-work puzzles for mobile users. We first introduce a novel concept of edge computing for mobile blockchain. Then, we introduce an economic approach for edge computing resource management.
shows the diagram of a blockchain structure. For each block in the blockchain, there are typically two parts, i.e., transaction data and hash values. Transaction data are recorded by the blockchain users or systems, e.g., mobile IoT devices. Hash values are used to store coded or secured information. A hash value in a block is generated based on the information of the previous block, which is similar to a link pointing from the current block to the block prior to it. The first block in the blockchain is called genesis block which does not have a hash value pointing the earlier block. Other data structures can also be included in the structure of a block to improve security and transaction performance requirements, e.g., a timestamp, and a hash tree (namely, Merkle tree) to store data blocks and to hash the previous transaction information into the non-leaf tree node. In general, blockchain operates in the following steps. 1) A blockchain user performs a transaction and creates a new transaction record. The new transaction will be transferred to neighboring peer users in the blockchain network.
2) Each neighboring peer user collects the transferred transactions for a certain period of time.
Invalid user transactions, e.g., fake transactions, or negative balance in debit account, will be discarded. After the period, the user which has collected a set of transactions packs the transactions into a block and performs mining.
3) The mined block is then sent into the network to notify other blockchain users. Other users which receive the mined block will examine the validity with security mechanisms accordingly. If the block is proved valid, it will be appended to the end of the current blockchain.
In this case, the users' view, i.e., contents and structures of the current blockchain, has been updated. The transactions in the block created in Step 2 are generally accepted by blockchain users. This is referred to as the consensus.
B. Consensus and Mining: A Trust Overlay on a Trustless Network
Blockchain can offer more than cryptography for transactions in trustless distributed networks.
In particular, blockchain guarantees that transaction records in the blockchain are acknowledged and accounted by many users. The encryption techniques are adopted to prevent the records from being changed, falsified, or deleted by malicious middleman users. Then, consensus is a mechanism to ensure trust in the network, which means that users in the network commonly reach an agreement of a block added to the existing blockchain. For an attacker injecting a false transaction, the users which receive the false transaction can discover the attacking behavior by obtaining commonly acknowledged transaction records from the network. As such, the majority of users can "veto" to discard the false transaction. The deployment of consensus can be useful for distributed computing systems where users are relatively independent and belong to different parties, e.g., mobile networks [8] .
However, given a simple mining process, consensus may still be vulnerable to attacks, e.g., Byzantine attack and Sybil attack, where an attacker creates mixed information (i.e., fake blockchain) and pseudonymous users in the network, respectively. These fake blockchain information and pseudonymous users can lead to the consensus of false transactions generated by the attacker.
The solution to such attacks is to raise the complexity of mining so that attackers may not have enough computing power to support enough fake users in the network. Proof-of-work puzzles are used to increase the mining complexity. Confirming and securing the integrity and validity of transactions are executed by a set of miners. The security of blockchain relies on the distributed consensus mechanism maintained by these miners. In practical blockchain systems, e.g., Bitcoin, a miner which successfully mines a block receives the mining reward when the mined block is successfully added to the blockchain. This consensus mechanism guarantees the security and dependability of blockchain systems [4] , [5] . In such a network where mining is costly, malicious users need to control over 51% of all the computing power in the network to mislead the network to accept a false block. This is an enormous cost for a malicious user which can rarely be feasible in practice.
III. MOBILE EDGE COMPUTING FOR BLOCKCHAIN

A. Beyond Bitcoin: Mobile Edge Computing Enabled IoT with Blockchain
Blockchain is commonly known to the public because of Bitcoin. Besides that, blockchain has found many applications in various networks and distributed systems today. A typical application scenario is IoT [9] , [10] . IoT systems can connect a variety of physical objects such as mobile devices, sensors and actuators to the Internet. The IoT devices can sense, communicate, and exchange information with each other to achieve a certain goal of the systems, e.g., smart transportation, logistics, healthcare, and manufacturing. Economic models are applied for information and resource allocation in IoT [11] . As a public ledger framework, blockchain is suitable for IoT, where IoT devices can exchange information and resources independently and autonomously with formalized trading processes and rewards. These can be defined as transactions in blockchain.
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Hash of k IoT systems specifically because of the mining process. This is a common and major barrier to deploying blockchain in other mobile systems. Instead, mobile edge computing can supply the resources to cater to blockchain computing demands. Mobile edge computing [6] allows service providers to deploy cloud computing services at the "edge" of the mobile Internet as shown in Figure 1 . For example, base stations equipped with a small data center or a set of servers in radio access networks can accept offloaded jobs from adjacent mobile and IoT devices [12] .
By providing local computing power, edge computing enables blockchain deployment in IoT networks to support solving proof-of-work puzzles, hashing, encryption algorithms, and possibly consensus.
Interactions among edge computing service providers and IoT devices or IoT users 1 can be modeled as market activities, where edge computing service providers sell resources such as data and computing power, and receive reward, i.e., revenue, in return from IoT devices which need the resources. In practice, the similar concept that integrates cloud and blockchain has been realized. For example, Microsoft provides Blockchain as a Service (BaaS) on the Azure cloud
platform. A UK company CloudHashing offers customers Bitcoin Mining as a Service (MaaS)
where users only buy software services online to mine Bitcoins, without deploying hardware equipments. IBM provides Watson IoT platform to manage IoT data in a private blockchain ledger, which is integrated in IBM's business-level cloud services. Despite all the cloud-based blockchain applications, economic models for blockchain transactions in edge computing systems are not well studied.
B. Application Scenarios
Mobile edge computing for IoT with blockchain can be applied to various application scenarios.
1) Crowdsourcing: Crowdsourcing in IoT systems allows an undetermined set of IoT devices to incrementally generate and modify contents to complete a task, e.g., sensing. Mobile edge computing enabled blockchain can provide transparent and secured transferring of data as digitized assets [9] . Due to the constraints of computing power, IoT devices may offload data to edge computing servers for further processing. Historical traceable records are available in blockchain for reward and payment to IoT devices.
2) Smart Grid: Smart grid systems [13] contain heterogeneous sensors, e.g., smart meters.
For smart meters, energy consumption data and energy transactions are recorded. Mobile edge computing for IoT with blockchain can be integrated alongside with smart meters to process complex jobs automatically, e.g., making transactions, executing smart electricity contracts and balancing the grid load [14] . The similar concept can be applied for plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) [3] to support energy storage sharing.
C. Open Issues
There are still many open issues to be addressed in the mobile edge computing for IoT with blockchain.
1) Security Issues in Mobile Edge
Computing for IoT with Blockchain: Although blockchain offers attractive security features for distributed data processing and storage, some security issues emerge when blockchain is tailored for edge computing enabled IoT systems, especially private blockchains. One possible implementation can be the small-scaled "whitelisted" IoT networks [9] where all the network nodes trust each other, and PoW is not necessarily required as a trust mechanism. In this case, attacks can happen when transaction data is transferred from mobile IoT devices to the mobile edge computing servers. A secure and trust network between the devices and the servers is required. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks can be easily launched in mobile IoT networks as IoT devices have less protection. Likewise, since mobile IoT devices rely on wireless transmission, jamming attacks can disrupt the blockchain data exchange.
2) Unbalanced Computing Power: Trust is not necessary in blockchain networks given that the consensus method is well designed. However, an attacker can cheat and falsify blockchain records if the attacker can control over 51% computing power of the blockchain network. The attacker needs to cooperate with a large number of blockchain miners in the network which might be practically hard to achieve. However, in IoT systems with mobile edge computing services, this problem becomes critical due to the low computing power of mobile IoT networks. Only a few collusive or compromised servers may cause the "51% attack" cooperation situation easily.
Effective mechanisms to prevent such a collusion need to be developed.
3) Resource Utilization and Allocation: As aforementioned, mobile IoT devices are not able to efficiently solve proof-of-work puzzles of blockchain. Mobile edge computing service can be adopted to perform the mining. In the following, we present a new paradigm for offloading the mining task to the edge of pervasive networks nearby IoT users. Further, we implement the demonstrative prototypes of mobile edge computing enabled blockchain networks and analyze the resource utilization.
IV. DEMONSTRATION SYSTEMS OF MOBILE EDGE COMPUTING ENABLED BLOCKCHAIN
To demonstrate the feasibility and practicability of the proposed mobile edge computing enabled blockchain presented in Section III, we implement a demonstration system of a mobile edge computing enabled blockchain system. As illustrated in Figure 2 (a), in wireless and mobile blockchain systems, nodes, e.g., IoT devices, need to perform mining on resource rich edge computing devices, such as servers and workstations. The experiment is implemented on a workstation with Intel Xeon CPU E5-1630 as the edge computing server and Android devices as the mobile nodes which are also the miners, installing a mobile blockchain client application.
The application can be to record data using internal sensors, e.g. an accelerometer and GPS, or the transactions of mobile peer-to-peer data transfer. Each miner's working environment has one CPU core as its processor. The workstation's processor and its CPU utilization rate are To validate the proposed model of mobile edge computing enabled blockchain systems in Section III, we conduct the following real experiments. We first create 1000 blocks using Node.js and use the mobile devices to initiate the mining of these blocks. We consider two cases with three miners and four miners, respectively. In the three-miner case, we first fix the other two miners' edge computing service demand (CPU utilization) at 40 and 60, and then vary one miner's edge computing service demand. In the four-miner case, we first fix the other three miners' service demand as 40, 50 and 60, and then vary one miner's service demand. In our experiment, the number of transactions in each mined block is 10, i.e., the size of a block is the same. Note that the delay effects are negligible. The experimental results are shown in Figure 2(b) in which when the edge computing service demand increases, the probability that the miner wins the mining process is higher. We also compare the experimental results with the theoretical calculation of the probability as calculated in [15] . Clearly, the analytical and experimental results reasonably match, from which the validity of our analytical model is justified.
V. MOBILE EDGE COMPUTING RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN BLOCKCHAIN
In this section, we first present the system model of edge computing for mobile blockchain.
Again, since the mobile edge computing service for blockchain miners is deployed by the service provider, it aims to maximize the profit. Therefore, the miners have to consider the reward from mining and the price paid to the provider in deciding on the computing demand to access to the mobile edge computing service. Therefore, we consider the edge computing service management and pricing issue for mobile blockchain. Specifically, we present a two-stage Stackelberg game formulation and equilibrium analysis.
A. Mobile Edge Computing for Blockchain Mining
We consider a mobile blockchain application which is supported by edge computing. The mobile blockchain network is composed of N mobile IoT users acting as the miners. Each user runs mobile blockchain applications to record the transactions performed in the network. There is an edge computing service provider deploying the edge computing units/nodes for the miners.
The proof-of-work puzzle can be offloaded to the edge computing unit, and the miners are priced by the provider. Figure 3 shows the system model of the mobile blockchain network under our consideration. The offloaded mining process is secured by some security solutions, such as data masking or obfuscation to hide the details of puzzle solving of the blockchain.
The mobile edge computing provider, i.e., the seller, receives the payment from the miners, i.e., the buyers, which access and consume the edge computing service. Each miner decides on an individual service demand in accordance with the current blockchain operation, e.g., blockchain data synchronization. Here, the demand can be the CPU speed or the number of CPU cores to In the mobile blockchain network, miners compete against each other in order to be the first to successfully solve the proof-of-work puzzle. Once successfully solving the puzzle, the miner broadcasts its solution to the whole mobile blockchain network to reach consensus. The first miner to successfully mine a block that reaches the consensus earns the mining reward accordingly. The reward is from the blockchain applications. For miner i, the utility function is defined as follows:
where x ∆ = (x 1 , . . . , x N ) and x −i represent the edge computing service demand vector of all the miners and all other miners except miner i, respectively. There are a fixed reward R and a variable reward rt i , where r is a given variable reward factor, and t i represents the size of block, i.e., the number of transactions included in the block that miner i successfully mines. However, even though the miner has successfully mined a block, there could still be a chance that the consensus may not be reached in the blockchain network due to long latency of transmission. As a result, the utility function includes the probability P i (α i (x i , x −i ), t i ) that miner i successfully mines the block, and its solution reaches consensus, i.e., miner i wins the mining reward, where
x j is defined as the relative computing power of miner i. Additionally, the process of solving the puzzle incurs an associated cost, i.e., miner i pays a unit price p i to the provider for using the computing power from the edge computing service.
B. Two-Stage Stackelberg Game Formulation and Equilibrium Analysis
The interaction between the provider and miners can be modeled as a two-stage Stackelberg game, as illustrated in Figure 3 . The provider, i.e., the leader, sets the price of the service per computing unit in the upper Stage I. The miners, i.e., the followers, decide on their optimal computing service demand for offloading the mining task in the lower Stage II, being aware of the price set by the provider. By using backward induction, we formulate the optimization problems for the leader and followers as follows.
1) Sub-game: Miners' Mining Strategies in Stage II: When participating in the sub-game, each miner i decides on a value of the mining demand x i maximizing the expected utility
given all the other miners' demands, i.e., strategies, as well as the edge computing service price p i charged to the miner. In distributed mobile IoT systems, users can be treated as rational game participants, which make decisions to maximize their own payoffs. Thus, each miner i has the sub-game problem as follows:
The constraint indicates that the demand must be bounded.
2) Sub-game: Provider's pricing strategies in Stage I: The profit of the provider, Π(p, x) is the revenue obtained from charging the miners for edge computing service minus the service cost, where p denotes the optimal unit price vector of edge computing service for all the miners.
The service cost is a function of the service demand, the time that the miner takes to mine a block, and the other costs, e.g., electricity. Practically, the constraint in the sub-game denotes that the price is upper bounded. The provider solves the sub-game problem to maximize its profit defined as follows: 
3) Solving Game Equilibrium: The two stages of sub-games aforementioned together form the Stackelberg game. The objective of the game is to find the Stackelberg equilibrium. The
Stackelberg equilibrium is a point where the payoff of the leader is maximized given that the followers adopt their best responses, i.e., the Nash equilibrium in their sub-game. In the mobile edge computing enabled blockchain system, the solution of the game has a practical meaning of importance. In particular, if the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium is proved, the miners and the provider can potentially reach a market agreement to trade edge computing power for blockchain mining.
For the provider's pricing, the uniform and discriminatory pricing schemes can be adopted.
Miners are charged by the provider with a same unit price p in the uniform pricing scheme. For the discriminatory pricing scheme, the provider charges each miner i with exclusive unit price p i . The uniform pricing is easier to implement as the provider does not need to keep track of information of all miners, and charging the same prices is fair for miners. However, it may not yield the highest profit compared with discriminatory pricing scheme.
The solution of the Stackelberg game, as well as the proof of the existence and uniqueness of each sub-game equilibrium can be done by employing backward induction. The detailed proof steps are presented in [15] . We take the uniform pricing case as an example as follows.
• For existence of the Nash equilibrium in Stage II, we can prove that the miner sub-game is a concave game, from which the existence of the Nash equilibrium follows. The key aspect of the existence proof is to show the concavity of the utility function of miner i, i.e., the second order derivative of u i (·) is negative.
• For uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in Stage II, we can derive an analytical condition of miner parameters, which, if the condition is satisfied, guarantees the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. The key aspect of the uniqueness proof is to show that the best response function of each miner is the standard function [15] .
• For the optimal pricing in Stage I, the provider as the leader in the Stackelberg game, obtains the optimal price p for the uniform pricing scheme and p i for the discriminatory pricing scheme charged to each miner by substituting the solved Nash equilibrium of edge computing service demand in the miner game in Stage II into (3), and solving the optimal problem in (3).
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We investigate the performance of the proposed edge computing resource management for mobile blockchain applications. We consider a group of N mobile blockchain miners in the network and assume the size of a block mined by miner i follows the normal distribution N (µ t , σ 2 ). System parameters are set as in [15] . Figure 4 : Impacts of number of miners on total service demand. (x is normalized to be 100. In the legend, UP:
A. Impacts of the Number of Miners
Uniform Pricing, and DP: Discriminatory Pricing)
From Figure 4 , we observe that the total service demand of miners and the profit of the provider increase with the increase of the number of miners in mobile blockchain. This is due to the fact that having more miners will intensify the competition of mining, which potentially motivates them to have higher service demand. Further, the coming miners have their service demand, and thus the total service demand from miners is increased. In turn, the provider extracts more surplus from miners and thereby has greater profit gain. Additionally, it is observed that the rate of service demand increment decreases as the number of miners increases. This is from the fact that the incentive of miners to increase their service demand is weakened because the probability of successful mining is reduced when the number of miners increases. We also observe that the total service demand of miners and the profit of the provider increase as µ t increases. This is because when µ t , i.e., the average size of one block increases, the variable reward for each miner also increases. Thus, the incentive of miners to increase their service demand rises, and accordingly the total service demand of miners increases. Consequently, the provider achieves greater profit gain.
B. Impacts of Reward on Miners
We study a group of 3 mobile blockchain miners in the network to explore the impacts of reward on each specific miner. As expected, we observe from Figure 5 (a) that the optimal price under discriminatory pricing charging to the miners with the smaller block is lower, e.g., miners
1 and 2. This is because the variable reward of miners 1 and 2 for successful mining is smaller than that of miner 3. Thus, miners 1 and 2 have no incentive to pay a high price for their service demand as miner 3. In this case, the provider can greatly improve the individual service demand of miners 1 and 2 by setting lower prices to attract them. Due to the competition from other two miners, miner 3 also has an incentive to increase its service demand. However, due to the high service unit price, consequently, miner 3 reduces its service demand for saving cost.
Nevertheless, the increase of service demand from miners 1 and 2 are greater. Therefore, the total service demand and the profit of the provider are still improved under discriminatory pricing compared with uniform pricing.
Further, from Figure 5 (a), we observe that the optimal prices for miners 1 and 2 increase with the increase of fixed mining reward. This is because as the fixed reward increases, the incentives of miners 1 and 2 to have higher service demand are greater. In this case, the provider is able to raise the price and charge more for higher revenue, and thus achieves greater profit.
Additionally, we observe from Figure 5 (b) that the optimal prices for miners 1 and 2 decrease as the variable reward factor increases. This is because when the variable reward factor increases, the incentive of each miner to have higher service demand is greater. However, the incentives of the miners with smaller block to mine, i.e., miners 1 and 2, are still not much as that of miner 3, and become smaller than that of miner 3 as the variable reward factor increases. Therefore, the provider intends to set the lower price for miners 1 and 2 which may induce more individual service demand.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this article, we have introduced the concept of edge computing for mobile blockchain applications. Specifically, mobile IoT users can use edge computing service offered by an edge computing service provider for blockchain mining tasks. We have demonstrated the testbed with some experimental results. Then, for efficient edge computing resource management for mobile blockchain, we have presented a Stackelberg game model. In addition to the game analysis, we have also conducted the numerical simulations to evaluate the network performance, which help the edge computing service provider achieve optimal resource management and gain the highest profit.
